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TENANCIES IN ANTIQUITY:
A TRANSFORMATION OF CONCURRENT
OWNERSHIP FOR MODERN
RELATIONSHIPS
PETER M. CARROZZO*
I. INTRODUCTION
The methods of concurrent ownership of property recognized in the
United States today are nearly six hundred years old.' They were born
at a time when the Renaissance was barely gestating, when a flat earth
was the center of the universe, and when kings were divine.2 To fully
appreciate the antiquity of these ancient tenancies, consider the state of
the fifteenth century world: it was a time before the discovery and
colonization of the New World, and a time before the rise of democracy
and constitution-making in the very places where these tenancies are
now prevalent.3 Yet the relics of real property law persist
This paralysis in the law preserves a special estate for married
persons known as the tenancy by the entirety, along with its plethora of
rights and benefits Currently, the institution of marriage-remarkably
older than the concept of land ownership-is at the center of a
controversial struggle to expand the institution's definition. Most
recently, the Vermont Supreme Court held that the exclusion of same-
sex couples from the benefits of marriage violated the state
constitution.6 Albeit a watershed moment, this is just one battle in a
large war. As the war wages on, another option is available. As this
Article will propose, that option is to modernize the methods of
* J.D., St. John's University; LL.M., New York University School of Law. A great debt
of gratitude is owed to William E. Nelson for his constant guidance and support during the
course of this project.
1. See generally CASES AND MATERIALS ON MODERN PROPERTY LAW 242-45,277-80
(Jon W. Bruce & James W. Ely, Jr. eds., 4th ed. 1999).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 279-80.
6. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (1999).
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concurrent ownership of real property and thereby equalize rights
among the numerous concepts of "family" which currently exist.
Legal scholars have enumerated the flaws and inadequacies with the
methods of concurrent ownership as they are currently composed. In a
recent article, John V. Orth uncovers numerous anomalies and
intricacies inherent in the tenancy by the entirety. 7 Professor Orth
maneuvers through the muddled incidents of the tenancy by the
entirety, frequently commenting on its illogical evolution and "jerry-
built structures."' Toward the end of his article, he raises the question
of extending the privileges of the estate to unmarried persons.9
Considering the current "attenuated" state of marriage and the many
couples today "that function as couples but that are not, for one reason
or another, legally united," he concludes: "Why should the law-to use
fashionable jargon-'privilege' one relationship above others?""0 This
Article attempts to address the call for change trumpeted by Professor
Orth.
After discussing the methods of concurrent ownership, describing
their ancient origins and languid evolution, and briefly describing the
state of the war over equal rights for same-sex relationships (and
commenting on those ignored in the controversy), this Article proposes
a solution to remedy the inequality-the creation of a new and more
equitable tenancy.
II. METHODS OF CONCURRENT OWNERSHIP: AN OVERVIEW
"Concurrent ownership of real property exists whenever two or
more persons have a concurrent and equal right to the possession and
use of the same parcel of land."" Alternatively, in the words of William
Blackstone, land held in severalty exists whenever a sole tenant holds
the land "in his own right only, without any other person being joined or
connected with him in point of interest, during his estate therein. '" ' 2
7. John V. Orth, Tenancy by the Entirety: The Strange Career of the Common-Law
Marital Estate, 1997 BYU L. REV. 35 (1997).
& Id. at 43-47.
9. Id. at 47.
10. Id. at 48.
11. ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 5.1, at 187 (2d ed.
1993).
12. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 179 (Leslie
B. Adams ed., 1983) (1785). At the outset of his chapter on estates, Blackstone spends one
paragraph on severalty as a method of holding estates in land. Briefly, he notes that it "is the
most common ... [method] of holding an estate," and states that: "there is little or nothing
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Today in the United States, three forms of concurrent ownership exist in
a majority of jurisdictions. They are joint tenancy, tenancy in common,
and tenancy by the entirety. 3
A. Joint Tenancy
A joint tenancy is an estate in real property owned by two or more
individuals where each owner has an equal right to the use and
enjoyment of the estate during his or her life.4 An incidence of joint
tenancy is the right of survivorship whereby, upon the death of a joint
tenant, the entire estate goes to the survivor. 5 Where three or more
persons hold as joint tenants, the remaining survivors share the interest
of the deceased joint tenant. 6 This process continues until the last
surviving joint tenant takes the entire estate. An estate held in joint
tenancy cannot be devised and is not subject to the laws of intestacy as
long as one joint tenant survives. 8 Heirs and creditors of a deceased
joint tenant have no rights to the estate. 9
Inevitably, the existence of a joint tenancy requires determining
whether the four unities-time, title, interest and possession-are
present.? For the four unities to be present, it is necessary for the joint
tenants' interests to accrue at the same moment (unity of time); by the
same deed or conveyance (unity of title); each joint tenant must possess
an equal undivided share of the entire estate (unity of possession); and
their interests must be equal in length and quality (unity of interest).2'
At common law, if one of the four unities was not present, a joint
tenancy could not exist." An ineffectual attempt to create a joint
tenancy results in the creation of a tenancy in common.'
Although the four unities are still important in determining the
peculiar to be remarked concerning it, since all estates are supposed to be of this sort, unless
where they are expressly declared to be otherwise." Id.
13. CUNNINGHAM ET AL, supra note 11, § 5.1, at 187.
14. 20 AM. JUR. 2D Cotenancy and Joint Ownership § 3 (1995).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. § 4.
21. Id.
22. 7 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 51.03[1], at 51-13 (Michael
Allen Wolf ed., 1999).
23. 2 THOMAS E. ATKINSON ET AL., AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.2, at 9 (A.
James Casper ed., 1952). For a discussion of tenancy in common, see infra pp. 427-29.
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existence of a joint tenancy, ' the trend in several jurisdictions is to
replace the rigid unities analysis with an examination of the parties'
intent.' In certain situations, the four unities can become quite
cumbersome. For example, where an owner of real property in
severalty wants to create a joint tenancy with another, the common law
necessitated a transfer to a third party-called a "straw man"-as an
intermediary. 6 This "straw man" would then transfer the property back
to the original owner and the desired joint tenant or tenants.27 Some
states have eliminated the necessity for this rigmarole by statute or
judicial decision,29 allowing a direct conveyance to effectuate the same
result. The easing of these rules depicts the further willingness of courts
and legislatures to look beyond the four unities since the direct
conveyance illustrated above lacks the unities of time and title.
A joint tenancy can only be created by an act of the parties such as a
grant or devise. 8 Therefore, it is never created by operation of law." To
create a joint tenancy, the habendum clause of the deed or conveying
instrument must exhibit the clear intent of the parties. 2 So, a transfer
"'to A and B, and to the survivor of them"' or some other similar
language is required by courts in order to establish the creation of a
joint tenancy.33 If the deed or other conveying instrument names two or
more individuals as grantees and contains no language specifying how
the parties shall hold, a tenancy in common results.'
Unilateral severance of a joint tenancy can be achieved simply by an
act of one joint tenant that destroys any one of the four unities;35
24. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 11, § 5.3, at 194 n.7.
25. 20 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 14, § 4.
26. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 11, § 5.3, at 198.
27. Id.
28. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184, § 8 (West 1991).
29. See, e.g., Therrien v. Therrien, 42 A.2d 538 (N.H. 1946).
30. 20 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 14, § 9.
31. Id.
32. Id.§7.
33. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 11, § 5.3, at 195; see also In re Russell, 61 N.E. 166
(N.Y. 1901).
34. 7 POWELL, supra note 22, § 50.02[2], at 50-6 to 50-7. This marks a change in the
common law, which preferred joint tenancies and required specific language to create a
tenancy in common. Id. § 50.02[2], at 50-6. Gradually, legislatures and courts eased the
requirements of specific language. Id. "In the United States, virtually every jurisdiction has a
statute that creates a presumption favoring tenancies in common over joint tenancies, or
abolishes joint tenancies or the right of survivorship." Id.
35. 20 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 14, § 21.
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however, intent to sever must be exhibited.3 Also, the joint tenancy can
be destroyed by an outright conveyance of one tenant's interest-by
entering into an agreement to convey or encumber the estate.' This
may be done without the consent of other joint tenants.' The ultimate
grantee of a joint tenant's interest becomes a tenant in common with the
former joint tenant. In the case of three or more joint tenants, the
remaining tenants continue to hold as joint tenants in relation to each
other.'
The ability to effectuate a unilateral severance places joint tenants in
a precarious situation. As a result, creditors of an individual joint tenant
can sever the tenancy through a sale on execution." Upon severance,
the new owner will be a tenant in common with the other joint tenants
and will inevitably bring a partition action.42 Thus, through severance,
the entire estate will be destroyed and the original intent of the parties
entering into the tenancy will be frustrated.
An additional idiosyncrasy of the joint tenancy is the loophole by
which one joint tenant can make a secret conveyance of his interest,
severing his share through a unilateral deed, which will then be placed in
a secure place such as a safe deposit box." Upon the death of the
unscrupulous joint tenant, the deed will be discovered and the
remaining joint tenants, as a result of the severance, will have no right of
survivorship.45 However, if an unsuspecting, innocent joint tenant dies
first, the survivorship right of the crafty joint tenant will be preserved
and the former secret deed will then be destroyed with no one being any
wiser.'
B. Tenancy in Common
A tenancy in common is an estate held by two or more persons
whereby each tenant has several separate interests in the land but an
36. Id.
37. Id. §§ 21-22.
38. Id.
39. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 11, § 5.4, at 199-200.
40. Id. at 200.
41. See id. at 202.
42. 20 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 14, § 29.
43. See generally id. §§ 21-22, 29.
44. See Samuel M. Fetters, An Invitation to Commit Fraud: Secret Destruction of Joint
Tenant Survivorship Rights, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 173,175 (1986).
45. See id.
46. See id.
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undivided possession of the entire estate.47 Simply put, as Blackstone
states, "tenancies in common differ in nothing from sole estates, but
merely in the blending and unity of possession."4 As a result of these
several separate interests, and unlike the joint tenancy, there is no right
of survivorship between or among tenants in common.4  When one
tenant in common dies, his or her interest is administered as part of his
or her estate and will either devise by will or descend by the laws of
intestacy. The four unities are not necessary to create a tenancy in
common." Tenants may acquire by different conveyances at different
times and be in possession of unequal shares.' Also, one tenant in
common could be in possession of a life estate while the another
possesses a remainder interest." The sole unity required is that of
possession.
A tenancy in common can arise by voluntary acts of the parties,
either through a deed or other form of inter vivos conveyance or
testamentary gift.' Additionally, since it is the default method of
ownership, a tenancy in common can arise by operation of law: either by
the laws of intestacy, by a failed attempt to create a different form of
cotenancy, or by the termination of a marriage of tenants by the
entirety.
5 6
Tenancies in common are freely alienable by the parties without
obtaining the consent of cotenants. 7 Thus, individual shares can be
transferred by deed, lease, will, or can be encumbered by a mortgage.'
Similar to joint tenancies, the creditors of a tenant in common can
perfect a judgment against and foreclose upon individual shares. Upon
foreclosure, the creditor becomes a tenant in common with the
remaining cotenants.60 Once again, the original intent of the parties
47. 7 POWELL, supra note 22, § 50.01[1], at 50-4.
48. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at 194.
49. Id.
50. 7 POWELL, supra note 22, § 50.01[2], at 50-5.
51. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 11, § 5.2.
52. CORNELIUS J. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 224
(1962).
53. CUNNINGHAM ETAL., supra note 11, § 5.2, at 190.
54. 20 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 14, § 32.
55. Id. § 36.
56. Id.
57. 7 POWELL, supra note 22, § 50.02[9], at 50-12.
5& Id.
59. See id. § 50.05[2], at 50-29.
60. Id.
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entering into the tenancy in common could easily be thwarted by an
action in partition brought by the new cotenant-creditor.61
C. Tenancy by the Entirety
An estate held by a husband and wife as a single entity, by reason of
the legal unity of marriage, is a tenancy by the entirety.62  An
indestructible right of survivorship attaches to this form of tenancy
whereby, upon the death of either spouse, the survivor takes the entire
estate.6 At common law, the four unities, discussed herein, were
necessary to create a valid tenancy by the entirety." Additionally, the
unity of person, satisfied only by a legal marriage between the tenants
by the entirety, was, and still is, an indispensable requirement.6
This fifth unity often presents some entanglements. In jurisdictions
that recognize the tenancy by the entirety, parties that take property as
husband and wife must be legally married as of the date of the
conveyance. 6 As a result, fianc6es who purchase real property and are
recited as husband and wife in the habendum clause of the deed in
anticipation of the marriage will not hold the property as tenants by the
entirety. Either a joint tenancy or a tenancy in common will arise,
depending on the jurisdiction.6
Under the common law, a conveyance or devise to a husband and
wife automatically created a tenancy by the entirety. 9 Although a
number of jurisdictions that recognize the tenancy by the entirety still
follow this rule, the trend in some states is to require a clear expression
of intent.7 This necessity is largely the result of statutes that create the
tenancy in common as the default method of concurrent ownership.1
Under the common law, just as with joint tenancies, a direct transfer
from an owner of real property in severalty (a sole owner) to himself or
herself and spouse would not create a tenancy by the entirety due to the
61. Id. § 50.07[3][a], at 50-40 to 50-41.
62. 41 AM. JUR. 2D Husband and Wife § 28 (1995).
63. Id.
64. 7 POWELL, supra note 22, § 52.01[1], at 52-3.
65. Id
66. 41 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 62, § 35.
67. Id.
68. Id.; see, e.g., Perez v. Gilbert, 586 N.E.2d 921 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992); Novak v. Novak,
516 N.Y.S.2d 878 (Sup. Ct. 1987).
69. 7 POWELL, supra note 22, § 52.01[2], at 52-3.
70. Id. § 52.02[2], at 52-16.
71. Id.
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absent unities of time and title.7 Thus, it was necessary to transfer to a
third party or "straw man."73 Most states today have statutes allowing a
direct transfer.
Unique to the tenancy by the entirety is its indestructibility by a
unilateral act of either spouse.7' A spouse may not unilaterally convey,
encumber, or alienate his or her interest, nor bring a partition action to
sever the estate, since the single marital unit-an entity unto itself-
holds the entire estate." The right of survivorship is freely alienable
provided the spouse who alienates survives.?
The value of the tenancy by the entirety is exhibited when judgment
creditors arise. A number of jurisdictions that recognize estates by the
entirety78 treat them as impregnable fortresses against the claims of an
individual spouse's creditors. 9 Jurisdictions vary in their approaches
and there is conflicting case law arising even within the same
jurisdiction.l A few states still cling to the common law and deny the
imposition of a valid lien by a judgment creditor of an individual
spouse." Some states subject the interest of the individual spouse to
levy and execution.' These states, however, hold that the ultimate
purchaser of such an interest at an execution sale will become a tenant
in common with the remaining spouse on title, but without the right to
force a partition.? Two states that recognize the tenancy by the entirety
allow it to be severed and the right of survivorship eradicated by
creditors of individual spouses8 Obviously, a joint obligation entered
into by both spouses-such as a mortgage entered into to purchase the
marital residence-can be satisfied out of a tenancy by the entirety.'
72- Id. § 52.02[51, at 52-18.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 11, § 5.5, at 205-06.
76. 41 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 62, § 41, at 43.
77. See 7 POWELL, supra note 22, § 52.03[5], at 52-25; 41 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 62, §
41, at 42.
78. The present status of the tenancy by the entirety in the United States will be treated
infra, Part III.C.
79. For a list of jurisdictions denying creditors access to an individual spouse's interest,
see 7 POWELL, supra note 22, § 52.03[3], at 52-22 n.7.
80. Id. at 52-22 to 52-24.
81. This is the law in Hawaii and Pennsylvania. Id. at 52-24 n.11.
82. Id. at 52-22 to 52-23.
83. For a list of states taking this approach, see id. at 52-23 n.8.
84. Id. at 52-23 n.10. This is the rule in Oklahoma and Tennessee. Id.
85. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 11, § 5.5, at 206.
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Similarly, "joint liabilities can still be satisfied out of [estates by] the
entirety. "
When an individual tenant by the entirety declares bankruptcy,
additional issues arise. Under bankruptcy law, a debtor's estate includes
"all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the
commencement of the case."' Federal law enumerates certain property
as exempt.& A state can choose to recognize the federal exemptions or
opt out of federal law and apply state exemptions.8 Debtors, too, have
the option of utilizing the federal or state exemptions.' Thus, under the
specific allowance in § 522(b)(2)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code, most
states that opt out of the federal exemptions allow debtors to exempt
property held as a tenancy by the entirety."
A crafty couple, armed simply with a marriage certificate, can easily
exploit this exemption. Since any property can be held as a tenancy by
the entirety, a husband and wife can purchase numerous investment
properties. One spouse could then incur significant debt, file
bankruptcy and retain all of the investment property held by the marital
unit.9 Such a scenario frustrates the spirit of this exemption. The
historic and present-day purpose for allowing this protection to married
couples is to prevent families from being forced from the marital home
and into a state of poverty due to the financial difficulties of one
spouse.'
Acting in concert, a husband and wife can terminate a tenancy by
the entirety by a joint conveyance to a third party; most jurisdictions
also allow termination by mutual assent or a conveyance of the interest
86. 7 POWELL, supra note 22, § 52.03[3], at 52-24.
87. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1994).
88. Id. § 522(d).
89. Id. § 522(b).
90. Id.
91. Id. § 522(b)(2)(B); see Michael 0. Massey, When the Tenancy by the Entirety
Doctrine Meets the Bankruptcy Code: Clash of the Titans, 73 FLA. B.J. 49, 52 (1999)
(explaining the procedure in the state of Florida).
92. Of course, the interests of a secured creditor (such as a mortgagee of the real estate)
could not be denied the remedy of foreclosure. 9A AM. JUR. 2D Bankruptcy § 1308 (1995).
Similarly, the interests of joint creditors would not be frustrated by this technique. Id. The
status of tenancies by the entirety with regards to bankruptcy law is currently in a state of
flux. Where a debtor spouse has any joint debt with the non-filing spouse, there is case law
allowing the entireties estates to be liquidated and distributed to both joint and individual
creditors. See In re Planas, 199 B.R. 211 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1996).
93. A. Mechele Dickerson, Family Values and the Bankruptcy Code: A Proposal to
Eliminate Bankruptcy Benefits Awarded on the Basis of Marital Status, 67 FORDHAM L. REV.
69,94-95 (1998).
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of one spouse to the other.94 Normally, divorce or annulment transforms
the tenancy by the entirety into a tenancy in common." Merely entering
into a legal separation agreement, absent a showing of intent to
terminate the estate, will not sever the tenancy by the entirety.9 A
subsequent remarriage of the former tenants by the entirety (now
tenants in common) will not operate to restore the estate.' Once the
estate is converted into a tenancy in common, either spouse can force a
partition, absent contrary agreement in the divorce decree.
III. ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF THE FORMS OF CONCURRENT
OWNERSHIP
A. Origins
Concurrent ownership of real property was recognized as early as
the time of Henry de Bracton, 9 one of the judges of the coram regae
(King's Bench) in the 1240s and 1250s.'" His treatise, De Legibus Et
Consuetudinibus Angliae [On The Laws and Customs of England],' is
believed to have been written sometime in the 1220s or 1230s using
current plea rolls of the King's Bench."°  Bracton's historic treatise'
speaks of joint tenants who are seised "pur my et pur tout"' 1 -that
venerable phrase which explains each tenants' simultaneous ownership
of an equal undivided fractional share ("pur my") and the entire estate
("pur tout")."°5 The right of survivorship ("jus accrescendi")1c6 seems to
94. 41 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 62, § 46, at 46-47.
95. Id. § 58, at 53.
96. 7 POWELL, supra note 22, § 52.05[4], at 52-32.
97. 41 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 62, § 60, at 54.
98. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 11, § 5.5, at 206.
99. WILLIAM F. WALSH, A HISTORY OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW § 115, at 211 (2d ed.
1932).
100. J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 23, 201 (3d ed.
1990).
101. Id. at 201. See also BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND (DE
LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGLIAE) (Woodbine and Thorne eds., 1968).
102. BAKER, supra note 100, at 201.
103. BRACTON, supra note 101. This treatise was only the second attempt to compile
"the whole of the common law," being preceded by the smaller treatise of the same name that
was familiarly called Glanvill for short, believed to be authored by a royal justice in 1187-
1189 (possibly Glanvill himself). BAKER, supra note 100, at 200-01.
104. AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN THE
UNITED STATES 3 (A. James Casner et al. eds., 1952) (citing BRACTON, supra note 101).
105. 7 POWELL, supra note 22, § 51.01[1], at 51-3.
106. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at 184. See also 2 BRACTON, supra note 101, at 54.
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have been an incident of joint tenancy from the outset of its creation.'07
In the thirteenth century and under the old common law, every
conveyance to two or more persons created a joint tenancy."a The
advantage of creating joint tenancies in this period was their effective
frustration of the incidents of feudalism.Y The most burdensome
incidents-wardship and marriage-attached where a tenant died with
minor children.1 In such a case, the estate would revert back to the
lord (upon whose estate the tenant lived, originally for the performance
of services by the tenant such as knight service).1 . who would be entitled
to all of the profits from the land during the period of infancy."2 This
profit would pay the expense of raising the ward. 3 Additionally, the
lord would be entitled to the great wealth exchanged upon arranging a
suitable marriage for the young heir or heiress.114 Thus, the joint
tenancy, with its accompanying right of survivorship, would prevent land
from reverting back to the lord; thereby, a system that was lucrative to
lords was thwarted." 5
Seemingly, the joint tenancy would have been the bane of lords;
however, there is some authority showing that they actually preferred
this method of ownership. 6 The law's treatment of joint tenants as one
person maintained a coherent and organized feudal system; a "single
feud" or estate lasted until the death of the last owner and thereby the
services due the lord were not divided. 7 Since the feudal system was
necessarily a contractual relationship of mutual dependence, the
existence of identifiable parties was crucial.'
By the time of Thomas Littleton's Tenures," published in 1481, the
joint tenancy was described in a way most recognizable today and with
107. WALSH, supra note 99, § 115, at 211.
108. 2 ATKINSON Er AL, supra note 23, § 6.1, at 3.
109. Id. § 6.1, at 3-4.
110. BAKER, supra note 100, at 275.
111. Id. at 257-59.
112. Id. at 275.
113. See id.
114. Id.
115. See id. at 288-89.
116. See generally id. at 256-60.
117. 2 ATKINSON ET AL., supra note 23, § 6.1, at 3-4; see also MOYNIHAN, supra note 52,
at 217.
118. BAKER, supra note 100, at 257-58.
119. 3 THOMAS LrITrLETON, TENURES § 277 (Eugene Wambaugh ed., John Byrne &
Co. 1903) (1481).
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all of its accompanying incidents.2
In addition to the joint tenancy, the English common law of the
thirteenth century recognized the tenancy in coparceny as the only other
form of concurrent ownership."' An estate in coparceny was one held
by female heirs of an owner in fee where the laws of primogeniture did
not apply because no male heirs of equal consanguinity (for example,
sons) existed." "This estate.., was created by the laws of inheritance,
never by deed or will,' as distinguished from joint tenancies (and
tenancies in common, as discussed infra) "which before the Statute of
Wills in 1540 could only be created by inter vivos conveyance." 24
Coparceners owned a single estate in equal shares but free of the
right of survivorship; the interest of each coparcener would pass to her
heirs upon death.2' Partition was a right unique to coparceners. In fact,
the origin of the name "parceny" appears to stem from this right.'2 As
primogeniture was never the law in the United States, the tenancy in
coparceny is a dinosaur of cotenancy; today it is a method of concurrent
ownership indistinguishable from and absorbed by the tenancy in
common.
127
Appearing soon after the joint tenancy, the tenancy in common
arose as a separate and distinct estate at the outset of the fourteenth
century, during the reign of Edward I. The birth of the tenancy in
120. Littleton, a popular Common Pleas judge under Edward VI, wrote his famous
treatise in the 1450s or 1460s. BAKER, supra note 100, at 215. It was published in 1481, one
year before the author's death. Id. Tenures has the distinction of being the first English law
book printed by the new printing press. Id. at 216. Its significance as a legal treatise cannot
be under-emphasized. Id. His work is renowned for its clarity and conclusiveness. Id. It was
written at a time when the law of real property had reached a "most settled stage of
development" and carried with it a certain authority that no prior treatise enjoyed. Id. at
215-16.
121. 2 ATKINSON El AL., supra note 23, § 6.1, at 3. Bracton discusses the tenancy in
coparceny and its incidents as an alternative method of concurrent ownership. AMERICAN
LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 104, at 3 (citing BRAcTON, supra note 101).
122. 3 LITTLETON, supra note 119, §§ 277-291. Littleton acknowledged that parceners
are daughters of an owner in fee dying without sons. Id. § 241. Additionally, parceners could
be sisters of an owner dying childless and with no brothers. Id. § 242. Furthermore, estates in
coparceny could arise where sons took land and the custom of the manor, as a holdover of
Anglo-Saxon Law, was for them to take as coparceners. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at
187; 2 ATKINSON ET AL., supra note 23, § 6.7, at 33.
123. 2 ATKINSON ET AL., supra note 23, § 6.7, at 33.
124. 7 POWELL, supra note 22, § 51.01[4], at 51-4.
125. 2 ATKINSON ET AL., supra note 23, § 6.7, at 33.
126. WALSH, supra note 99, § 115, at 215.
127. MOYNIHAN, supra note 52, at 236.
128. 3 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 127 (3d ed. 1923).
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common was an inevitable occurrence; upon the first partition action
Where the tenants continued to reside together on the land, a tenancy in
common arose necessarily.129 Additionally, evidence shows that the
tenancy in common arose at common law to describe an estate that
existed whenever one of the four unities was lacking."z
Similar to the joint tenancy, the tenancy in common was well
developed by the time of Littleton's Tenures. Littleton discusses the
numerous methods of creating the tenancy in common such as: through
separate titles held by owners of the same piece of land; by the
alienation of one joint tenant's interest;13' and by a transfer to two or
more owners and their heirs." Since the joint tenancy was the default
method of ownership at this time, an additional method of creating a
tenancy in common was "by special limitation in a deed. ""
The origins of the tenancy by the entirety are somewhat more
elusive. As early as the thirteenth century, Bracton recognized the
concept of a husband and wife owning a tenement in land jointly,TM but
the incidents of that ownership are not set forth. The concept of the, as
yet unnamed tenancy by the entirety, is first enunciated in the case
William Ocle and Joan his wife,3' decided during the reign of Edward III
in 132 7 ."' William Ocle and his wife purchased land together "to them
two and their heirs."' 7 Subsequently, William Ocle was executed for
high treason for the murder of the King's father, Edward II.1 As a
result of the treason, pursuant to feudal law, the land escheats to the
129. Id. This was decided in a 1304 case and it was held that the right of survivorship
would not attach to the estate that resulted since that would have prejudiced the lord by
denying him the incidents of the feudal tenure. Id. at 127 n.8 (citing Y.B. 32, 33 Edw. I. (R.S.)
34).
130. 2 ATKINSON ET AL., supra note 23, § 6.1, at 4; WALSH, supra note 99, § 115, at 215.
131. 3 L1TrLETON, supra note 119, § 292, at 137.
132. Id. § 296 (stating that in this scenario, the original owners will hold a joint estate
and their issue will be tenants in common).
133. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at 192. See also Part II.A (discussing joint tenancy
as the default method of owernship).
134. 3 BRACrON, supra note 101, at 129. "Some tenements are privately owned, the
property of an individual by himself, without a parcener or one joined to him, others are not
held alone but with another joined to him or a parcener: with one conjoined, as where a man
holds with his wife .... Id. (citation omitted).
135. 3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 128, at 128 (citing William Ocle and Joan his wife;
Mich. 33 Ed. III. Coram Regae Salop in Thesaur.; cp. Y.B. 39 Hen. VI. Hil. P1. 8).
136. Id.
137. 2 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: COMMENTARY UPON
LIrLETON § 291 (Professional Books Limited 1985) (1832) (quoting William Ode and Joan
his wife; Mich. 33 Ed. III. Coram Regae Salop in Thesaur.; cp. Y.B. 39 Hen. VI. Hil. P. 8).
138. Id.
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lord, in this case, King Edward III.139 This parcel of land was then
transferred to Stephen de Bitterly." John Hawkins, the heir of Joan
Ocle, petitioned the king as rightful heir to his parents' estate and
received judgment to the land.1 4' The oneness of person between
husband and wife was the determinative factor and led to the judgment
in favor of the heir of Joan Oce.42
Although Littleton does not cite the Ocle case, he addresses the
concept of tenancies by the entirety in a hypothetical where a husband
and wife take land in a joint estate with a third person. 3 Under these
circumstances, according to Littleton, the husband and wife are seised of
one moiety" and the third person is seised of the other moiety.'
45
And the cause is, for that the husband and wife are but one
person in law, and are in like case as if an estate be made to two
joint-tenants, where the one hath, by force of the jointure, the
one moiety in law, and the other[,] the other moiety.
46
Unlike joint tenancies and tenancies in common, the concurrent
ownership by husband and wife was necessitated by the unity of the
person: "[I]n the eyes of the law husband and wife were but one person:
they were two souls in one flesh." 47 As exhibited in the Ocle case, this
oneness of person made true concurrent ownership by husband and wife
a legal, albeit fictitious, impossibility." Thus, it was necessary for land
to be owned in its entirety "by the marital unit of husband and wife." '149
As a result, a fiction (the unity of husband and wife) bore a further
fiction, the "concurrent" ownership of land by one entity.5o
139. BAKER, supra note 100, at 274-75.
140. 2 COKE, supra note 137, § 291.
141. Id.
142. Id. A husband and wife "cannot take by moieties. Albeit baron and feme... be
one person in law, so as neither of them can give any estate or interest to the other." Id.
143. 3 LITrLETON, supra note 119, § 291, at 135-36.
144. The definition of a "moiety" is: "A half of something (such as an estate)." BLACK'S
LAW DICrIONARY 1021 (7th ed. 1999).
145. 3 LrrLETON, supra note 119, § 291, at 135-36.
146. Id. § 291, at 136.
147. BAKER, supra note 100, at 550-51.
148. 2 COKE, supra note 137, § 291.
149. 7 POWELL, supra note 22, § 52.01[2], at 52-3.
150. King v. Greene, 153 A.2d 49, 60 (N.J. 1959) (Weintraub, C.J., dissenting). In
referring to the tenancy by the entirety, a seemingly exasperated Chief Justice Weintraub
noted in his dissenting opinion:
[85:423
TENANCIES IN ANTIQUITY
Additionally, as scholars have noted, the feudal system played a part in
denying women the right to own property and in prompting the creation
of what would become the tenancy by the entirety.' "The exigencies of
feudalism demanded that the functions of ownership be vested in males,
presumably capable of bearing arms in war."'52
The first modem pronouncement of a husband and wife owning an
estate by the "entirety" is in William Blackstone's Commentaries;
however, it is still not given a status independent from its sister forms of
concurrent ownership.153  In the ninth edition of Blackstone's
Commentaries, the tenancy by the entirety is set forth as a separate and
distinct form of ownership:
And therefore, if an estate in fee be given to a man and his wife,
they are neither properly joint-tenants, nor tenants in common:
for husband and wife being considered as one person in law, they
cannot take the estate by moieties, but both are seised of the
entirety, per tout et non per my; the consequence of which is that
neither the husband nor wife can dispose of any part without the
assent of the other, but the whole must remain to the survivor.'
The estate by the entirety is a remnant of other times. It rests upon the fiction of a
oneness of husband and wife. Neither owns a separate, distinct interest in the fee;
rather each and both as an entity own the entire interest. Neither takes anything by
survivorship; there is nothing to pass because the survivor always had the entirety.
To me the conception is quite incomprehensible.
Id. Cornelius Moynihan, in his treatise on real property, characterizes the tenancy by the
entirety as "an anomaly based on an anachronism." MOYNIHAN, supra note 52, at 234.
151. See generally Oval A. Phipps, Tenancy by the Entireties, 25 TEMp. L.Q. 24 (1951).
152. Id. at 24.
153. Blackstone describes the different forms of owning estates in land in a chapter
entitled "Of Estates in Severalty, Joint-Tenancy, Coparcenary, and Common." The tenancy
by the entirety is notably missing from the chapter heading. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 179 (9th ed. 1783).
154. Id. at 182. For a discussion of the different editions of Blackstone's Commentaries,
see CATHERINE SPICER ELLER, THE WILLIAM BLACKSTONE COLLECTION IN THE YALE
LAW LIBRARY: A BIBLIOGRAPHICAL CATALOGUE (1938). The ninth edition is the first to
contain the discussion of a husband and wife owning an estate by its "entirety." That edition
was published posthumously in 1783. It purports to include "the last corrections of the author
and continued to the present time by Ri. Burn, LL.D." Richard Burn, the editor of this
popular edition upon which most later editions rely, noted in the "[a]dvertisement concerning
this ninth edition":
The editor judges it indispensible to preserve the author's text intire. The
alterations which will be found therein, since the publication of the last edition, were
made by the author himself, as may appear from a corrected copy in his own
handwriting. What the editor hath chiefly attended to is, to note the alterations
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This articulate pronouncement and definition of the tenancy by the
entirety is significant in the evolution of the estate for several reasons.
It marks the first time the term "entirety" is used to describe the method
in which a husband and wife own an estate.155 Apparently, Blackstone
treats "entirety" 156 as an antonym for the word "moiety." 15" Further, his
use of the phrase pur tout et non pur my is noteworthy.15 Here,
Blackstone is borrowing a page from Bracton's definition of joint
tenants who are seised "pur my et pur tout."1"9 This clever play on
Bracton's words effectively elucidates the convoluted manner in which
tenants by the entirety are said to hold; specifically, they own the entire
estate ("pur tout") but do not hold fractional shares ("non pur my").6
Thus, as early as the fifteenth century and the publication of
Littleton's Tenures, two of the methods of concurrent ownership which
we know today-joint tenancy and tenancy in common-had been fully
developed. Since Littleton compiled his treatise from older plea roles,
we can deduce that these forms of ownership are older still. From
Bracton's treatise and 1300s case law, we know that concepts similar to
the joint tenancy and tenancy in common were viable even a century
before. A primitive ancestor of the tenancy by the entirety is first
recognized in the Ode case from the thirteenth century.6" With the
publication of Blackstone's ninth edition in 1783, the tenancy by the
entirety had fully come of age, rounding out the last of the three
made by subsequent acts of parliament. These, together with some few other
necessary observations, in order to prevent confusion, are inserted separate and
distinct at the bottom of the page.
Id. Thus, we can infer the discussion on estates in entirety is from the pen of Blackstone.
155. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 153, at 182. This is not, however, the first time we see
the word "entirety" used. Blackstone also uses the word in his discussion of parceners.
"Parceners, though they have a unity, have not an entirety, of interest. They are properly
intitled each to the whole of a distinct moiety." 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at 188 (citing
Co. Litt. 163, 164 (citation in original) (Although the appearance of the word "entirety" pre-
dates the ninth edition, it is not used in the context of ownership by a husband and wife.)).
156. The definition of "entirety" is: "The whole, as opposed to a moiety or part."
BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 553 (7th ed. 1999).
157. See 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at 188.
158. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 153, at 182.
159. AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 104, at 3 (citing BRACTON, supra note
101).
160. Id.
161. 3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 128, at 126; 3 LITTLETON, supra note 119, §§ 277-324.
162. See 3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 128, at 128 (citing William Ocle and Joan his wife;
Mich. 33 Ed. III Coram Regae Salop in Thesaur; C.P. Y.B. 39 Hen. VI. Hil. Pl. 8).
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methods of concurrent ownership.' 6' As will be discussed, these
methods, specifically entireties, evolved to a certain extent; but it is
entirely conceivable that if Thomas Littleton were alive today, he would
have little difficulty recognizing the methods in which estates are held
concurrently.
B. Evolution
In nearly six hundred years of human history, change is bound to
occur. What is remarkable about the methods of concurrent ownership
is the extent to which they have stayed the same. The most notable
change in the joint tenancy and tenancy in common has been the switch
in the default method of ownership from the former to the latter.'6
Today, every jurisdiction in the United States has switched to the
tenancy in common as the default1 6 Besides this change, the tenancies
themselves have remained, for the most part, frozen in time.
Changes in the tenancy by the entirety were inevitable. The
nineteenth century saw women such as Elizabeth Cady Stanton and
Susan B. Anthony, the founding mothers of the women's movement,
challenging their subservience' 6 The result was the gradual toppling of
numerous sexist laws, concepts, and institutions-a movement that
continues into the present. 67 Clearly, the tenancy by the entirety in its
original form could not coexist with the Seneca Falls Declaration of
Independence of 1848." Once women began to question their second-
class citizenship, the tenancy by the entirety was a feeble foe.
Conceptually, the tenancy already sat upon an unstable foundation,
cracked by the numerous legal fictions necessary for it to stand. Thus, in
an 1820 treatise by Richard Preston, 69 we see early jabs at the oneness
of husband and wife:
In point of fact, and agreeable to natural reason, free from
artificial deductions, the husband and wife are distinct and
individual persons; and accordingly, when lands are granted to
163. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 153, at 182.
164. 20 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 14, §§ 21-22.
165. 7 POWELL, supra note 22, § 50.02[2], at 50-6 to 50-7. For a list of states and the
respective statutes or cases, see id. at 50-6 n.5.
166. ELLEN CAROL DuBois, FEMINISM AND SUFFRAGE: THE EMERGENCE OF AN
INDEPENDENT WOMEN'S MOVEMENT IN AMERICA 1848-1869, at 19-20 (1978).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 23.
169. 1 RICHARD PRESTON, AN ELEMENTARY TREATISE ON ESTATES (1820).
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them as tenants in common, thereby treating them without any
respect to their social union, they will hold by moieties, as other
distinct and individual persons would do.7'
Preston's treatise on estates recognizes the possibility of a husband
and wife owning land as tenants in common "as other distinct and
individual persons would do" appealing to nothing more than "natural
reason, free from artificial deductions."17' Upon relaxing the old English
common law mandate of the oneness between husband and wife, the
essence of the tenancy by the entirety, the crack in the foundation is
irreparable.'
Both Preston, and Edward Coke, in his Commentaries Upon
Littleton, highlight an additional incongruity, although neither
comments on the illogical consequences of the rule. When an estate was
transferred to a man and his intended wife, followed by a subsequent
marriage, the resulting estate would be a joint tenancy as opposed to a
tenancy by the entirety." The significance of this rule is in its
recognition of the individuality of the two spouses. The result was a
legal impossibility-one body, represented in the fictitiously merged
husband and wife, somehow held two moieties jointly. 74 Not even
Dickens could create a fiction sufficient to repair this anomaly.
The enactment of married women's property reform legislation in
the nineteenth century further weakened the unstable conceptual
170. Id. at 132. Following this sentence, Preston footnotes Coke's Institutes section 187b.
Id. However, Coke does not make this distinction regarding a husband and wife, during
marriage, taking land as tenants in common. 2 COKE, supra note 137, § 291. Further
evidence of the novelty of Preston's statement is a footnote in James Kent's Commentaries:
"Mr. Preston... says, that as the law is now understood, husband and wife may, by express
words, be made tenants in common, by a gift to them during coveture." 2 JAMES KENT,
COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 132 n.(c) (5th ed. 1844).
171. 1 PRESTON, supra note 169, at 132.
172. Preston's heretic claim, that a husband and wife could hold an estate from its
inception as tenants in common, was not universally and immediately accepted. 2 KENT,
supra note 170, at 132 n.(c). Kent cites authority questioning "the solidity of Mr. Preston's
opinion." Id.
173. 2 COKE, supra note 137, § 291. "And if an use be limited to a man and his intended
wife, prepatory to their marriage, and they intermarry, they would be joint-tenants, and not
tenants by entireties." Id. Coke explains, in a somewhat more cryptic fashion: "But if an
estate be made to a man and a woman and their heires before marriage, and after they marry,
the husband and wife have moities between them, which is implyed in these words of our
author [Littleton], husband and wife." Id. As noted earlier, this is still the rule in all
jurisdictions where the tenancy by the entirety exists. See supra notes 62-77 and
accompanying text.
174. 2 COKE, supra note 137, § 291.
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foundation of the tenancy by the entirety.' Under the common law,
and as a result of men's dominant status, husbands had complete and
exclusive control over estates in the entirety.7' "At common law, we
have said, husband and wife were a unity-and the husband, let us
hasten to add, was that unity."" Estates held by the entirety were under
the "exclusive control" of the husband; 8 he alone possessed the right of
alienability and the right to collect the rents and profits from the land.79
Additionally, the husband's creditors had the ability to reach an
entireties estate, subject only to the wife's right of survivorship."'
The inequity inherent in subjecting a wife's property to her
husband's speculative adventures and financial incompetence was the
impetus for the passage of the married women's property acts."' In fact,
protection of married women's property prompted the first wave of such
legislation and would eventually lead to sweeping reforms in a broad
range of areas." The first of these laws, enacted in the Arkansas
Territory in 1835, protected a wife's property from the pre-marital debts
of her husband.8 Following Arkansas, nearly every state and territory
enacted similar legislation protecting a wife's property.' Numerous
explanations have been offered for the broad emergence of this
legislation in the alternative to the aforementioned desire to equalize
rights between spouses.!' Debtors' rights legislation was popular in this
era as a result of the severe Panic of 1837."' Married women's property
acts could simply be viewed as an extension of this type of legislation.
However, as legal historians note, this was not the first time the country
had endured economic hardship, yet married women's property acts
175. See 7 POWELL, supra note 22, § 52.03[2], at 52-21 to 52-22.
176. Id. at 52-21.
177. 2 ATKINSON ET AL., supra note 23, § 6.6, at 27-28.
178. 7 POWELL, supra note 22, § 52.03[2], at 52-21.
179. Id.
180. 2 ATKINSON Er AL., supra note 23, § 6.6, at 28.
181. DUBOIS, supra note 166, at 42.
182. Richard H. Chused, Married Women's Property Law: 1800-1850,71 GEo. L.J. 1359,
1398 (1983).
183. Id. at 1398-99 (citing Act of Nov. 2,1835, 1835 ARK. TERR. LAWS 34-35).
184. Id. at 1398. Chused notes that the emergence of legislation enacted in this first
wave of married women's property acts occurred in a "deluge." Id.
185. Id. at 1400.
186. GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY AND PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS
OF PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 1176-1970, at 168 (1997). For a discussion of
the Panic of 1837, see Chused, supra note 182, at 1400-01.
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were wholly new.'87 "The acts must therefore have been part of a larger
evolution in the treatment of women by the law." "s
An additional driving force behind reform was the broader
movement to modernize and "Americanize" many of the arcane
concepts of the common law."8  Prompted in part by democratic
principles, numerous real property concepts such as fee tails, land
tenures, and future interests were questioned."9  Similarly, "the
common-law doctrine that husband and wife were one legal person
seemed to many critics a relic of a feudal hierarchical society that was
incompatible with democracy."91
By the end of the nineteenth century, and after two additional stages
of reform, married women's property was no longer treated as a special
and distinct form of ownership from all other property." The earlier
reforms from the first wave of legislation were abandoned; notably, the
law no longer immunized married women's property from the creditors
of husbands.'93 Alternatively, both the husband and wife had a separate
interest protected from the creditors of the other, and "husbands and
wives became jointly liable for purchases made for family purposes and
were separately liable for individual investments."" Entireties estates,
with respect to creditors, thereby, took on the form that we recognize
today.
The actual changes to tenancies by the entirety occurred at a
painfully slow pace. In fact, the gradual transformation commenced by
the married women's property acts had still not come to complete
fruition well into the twentieth century. A comprehensive seven volume
treatise written in 1952 notes: "[D]ivergent views have been taken in
various jurisdictions as to the rights of each spouse to alienate or
encumber his interest in property held in entirety .... ., 95 By this time, as
the same treatise recognizes, a majority of jurisdictions treated the
187. Chused, supra note 182, at 1403-04.
188. Id. at 1404. The author refers to numerous other 1840s reforms in the law, such as
changes in divorce, child custody, and abortion, to conclude that this was an active and
progressive period in the area of women's rights. Id. n.237.
189. ALEXANDER, supra note 186, at 169. For a more general analysis on the American
reform of English law, see WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON
LAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760-1830 (1975).
190. ALEXANDER, supra note 186, at 169.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 170.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. 2 ATKINSON ET AL., supra note 23, § 6.6, at 28.
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married women's property acts as having eliminated the common law
rule of the husband's unilateral control and enjoyment of the property.196
As a result, in most jurisdictions, the tenancy by the entirety became an
estate where "neither spouse has any specific interest to convey or
encumber, or any interest which a creditor of one of the spouses could
reach for the satisfaction of the debt."" Yet the ambiguity persists into
recent times. A 1976 Massachusetts case held that a husband's
unilateral control of property held by the entirety did not violate the
Fourteenth Amendment1 9
Contemporaneously with the aforementioned treatise, and further
indicating the state of flux in which the tenancy by the entirety is
perpetually mired, a law review article written at mid-century described
the state of the tenancy by the entirety in the United States!' 9 The
author of the article placed jurisdictions in three groups with regard to
their treatment of the estate after the enactment of the married
women's property acts:
(1) that tenancy by entireties, incapable of existence apart from
the common law property relations of spouses and the husband's
dominance, was necessarily destroyed through the wife's
emancipation; (2) that tenancy by entireties, not being
specifically mentioned, was not affected in any way by the
Married Women's Acts or other legislation dealing with general
marital relations, and therefore it still existed as at common law;
(3) that the destroyed incidents of the husband's dominance and
the wife's disabilities were incidents of the common law marital
status and not peculiarly incidents of tenancy by the entireties,
and therefore the tenancy may and does still exist, although
without such incidents.'
As the article notes, the enactment of reform legislation regarding
married women's property led to the early abrogation of the tenancy by
196. Id.
197. Id. at 29.
198. D'Ercole v. D'Ercole, 407 F. Supp. 1377, 1382 (D. Mass. 1976). Judge Tauro noted,
in his description of the tenancy by the entirety: "The husband during his lifetime has
paramount rights in the property." Id. at 1380. The court conceded that the tenancy by the
entirety was "balanced in favor of males" but held Mrs. D'Ercole's constitutional challenge
insufficient because married persons could alternatively create a joint tenancy or a tenancy in
common. Id. at 1382 (quoting Klein v. Mayo, 367 F. Supp. 583,585 (1973)).
199. Phipps, supra note 151, at 24.
200. Id. at 28 (footnotes omitted).
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the entirety in several jurisdictions who took the approach represented
by group one. 0' An 1860 Alabama case noted that since a husband and
wife are "capable of taking separately, it is impossible that they should
take by entireties, as if they constituted a single person."2w In fact, this
movement for equality led to the abolition of tenancies by the entirety
in 1925 in England-the birthplace of the estate.203
A few jurisdictions took the approach represented by group two and
maintained the arcane and sexist incidents of a husband-dominated
tenancy by the entirety.' The Massachusetts case of Pray v. Stebbins, 25
representing this approach, held that the married woman's property acts
only dealt with a woman's separate property.2 6 Therefore, tenancies by
the entirety, which concerned inseparable interests of a husband and
wife, were not altered, and consequently, not equalized, by the reformlegislation.'
The third and final approach taken by jurisdictions, that of
maintaining the estate but equalizing spousal rights in tenancies by the
entirety is depicted in the 1883 New York case, Bertles v. Nunan.2°8 At
issue was the continuing viability of the unity of husband and wife in the
aftermath of New York's legislation regarding married women's
property.' Four years earlier, a decision by the New York Court of
Appeals held that the tenancy by the entirety had been abrogated by the
reform legislation.210  However, that portion of the decision was not
joined by a majority of the judges.21' The Bertles court sought to resolve
the confusion and establish the New York rule on tenancies by the
201. Id. at 29.
202 Id. at 28 (quoting Walthall v. Goree, 36 Ala. 728,735 (1860)).
203. 7 POWELL, supra note 22, § 52.01[3], at 52-4 n.7. "A Husband and Wife Shall, for
All Purposes of Acquisition of Any Interest in Property, Under a Disposition Made or
Coming into Operation After Commencement of This Act, Be Treated as Two Persons." Id.
(quoting 15 & 16 Geo. V, c 2, § 37).
204. Phipps, supra note 151, at 29-31.
205. 4 N.E. 824 (Mass. 1886).
206. Id. at 827.
207. See id. at 826. North Carolina and Michigan were the other states following this
approach. Phipps, supra note 151, at 29-30. In recent times, the three states enacted statutes
equalizing the rights to control of and profits from entireties estates: Michigan in 1975 (MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 557.71(1) (West 1988)); Massachusetts in 1980 (MAss. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 209, § 1 (West 1998)); and North Carolina in 1982 (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-13.6
(1999)).
208. 92 N.Y. 152 (1883).
209. Id.
210. Meeker v. Wright, 76 N.Y. 262 (1879).
211. Id.
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entirety."'
The Bertles court recognized that the tenancy by the entirety was
one of many real property rules from feudal times whose reason or
purpose had long since disappeared.2 3  As practitioners of judicial
restraint, the court would not overturn the concept simply as a result of
its antiquity without some indication from the legislature.214 The
apparent intention of the legislature in enacting the married women's
reform acts "was not to destroy the oneness of husband and wife, but to
protect the wife's property, by removing it from under the dominion of
the husband. ',2 5 The tenancy by the entirety, although a product of the
sexist past, actually "enlarged" rather than "abridged" the rights of
married women.1 6 Thus, it was a concept that furthered the spirit of the
statute to protect married women's rights and therefore was not
eradicated.217
The reasoning of the court in Bertles seems emblematic of those
states where the tenancy by the entirety survived. An additional feature
of the case depicting the plodding nature of the change brought about
by the reform is the date of the decision. The first New York reform
legislation was enacted in 1848,28 yet the status of the tenancy by the
entirety was in flux until the Bertles decision in 1883.
The great confusion among jurisdictions, coupled with the glacial
transformation, led to a multiplicity of approaches and numerous
inconsistent rules that continue to the present day.
C. Present Status of the Tenancy by the Entirety
Today, in a majority of jurisdictions, the tenancy by the entirety is
still an accepted form of concurrent ownership by a husband and wife. 19
Nineteen jurisdictions have enacted statutes explicitly recognizing the
tenancy by the entirety?" Six states have statutes that incidentally
212. Berdes, 92 N.Y. at 165.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 164.
216. Id. at 165.
217. Id.
218. Act of Apr. 7, 1848, ch. 200, 1848 N.Y. Laws 307.
219. 7 PoNVELL, supra note 22, § 52.01[3], at 52-11.
220. Id. at 52-4 to 52-12. Those nineteen jurisdictions are as follows: Alaska, Delaware,
the District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Tennessee, and Wyoming. Id.
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mention the tenancy by the entirety and, therefore, seem to implicitly
recognize the estate."' Six additional states recognize entireties estates
in case law.m Thus, in a total of thirty states, the tenancy by the entirety
is an effective form of concurrent ownership for spouses.' Rounding
out the balance of jurisdictions, thirteen states have abolished the
tenancy by the entirety, either by statute or case law.'4 In the remaining
seven states, the status of the tenancy by the entirety is unknown, either
due to mixed decisions or silence by the courts and legislatures.2
IV. THE DIVERSITY AND CHANGING CONCEPTION OF MODERN
RELATIONSHIPS AND THE FAMILY
In the last fifty years, radical changes have taken place in the
concept of relationships and the definition of family. With the
emergence of same-sex relationships and cohabiting heterosexual
couples, the idea of a family as a husband, wife, and child as depicted in
numerous television shows and appliance advertisements from the
1950s, although not quite anachronistic, certainly is becoming just one
type of family among numerous options226
A. Waging War: Equal Rights for Same-Sex Relationships
On June 28, 1969, New York City police officers, armed with a
warrant, raided the Stonewall Bar in Greenwich Village-a "gay bar" in
violation of the State Liquor Authority's ban on serving alcohol to
221. Id. Those six states are: Arizona, Arkansas, Kansas, Kentucky, Nebraska, and
Utah. Id. These six states have simultaneous death, partnership, or intestacy statutes that
mention the tenancy. Id.
222. Id. Those six states are as follows: Georgia, Mississippi, Montana, Rhode Island,
Vermont, and Virginia. Id.
223. Id. It seems nothing is ever simple with the tenancy by the entirety. The number of
jurisdictions that recognize the tenancy by the entirety fluctuates depending on the source
consulted. A property treatise from 1993 lists the number of jurisdictions recognizing the
tenancy at twenty. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 11, § 5.5, at 203 n.3.
224. 7 POWELL, supra note 22, § 52.01[3), at 52-4 to 52-12. The tenancy by the entirety
has been abolished in California, Connecticut, Iowa, Maine, Minnesota, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, South Dakota, Washington, West Virginia, and
Wisconsin. Id.
225. Id. The states where the status of the tenancy is unknown are Alabama, Colorado,
Idaho, Illinois, Louisiana, South Carolina, and Texas. Id. Since Louisiana did not receive the
common law, their silence is understandable. Id. § 52.01[3], at 52-7.
226. William N. Eskridge, Jr., A History of Same-Sex Marriage, 79 VA. L. REV. 1419
(1993). Describing same-sex relationships as modem may be a dubious distinction. Eskridge
provides exhaustive accounts of same-sex unions recognized throughout recorded human
history and on most continents. Id. at 1435.
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homosexuals.'m These shakedowns were common events to the police
and bar patrons alike!m A handful of officers would arrest bar-goers
who clung to their anonymity. However, in an unprecedented turn of
events, the patrons of this establishment fought back. 9 A full-fledged
riot erupted and the two hundred patrons spilled onto Christopher
Street and Sheridan Square.'0 Before the evening was over, close to one
thousand bystanders eagerly lent a hand on behalf of the patrons-
fueled by years of frustrating oppression and hidden humiliation. ' The
helmeted Tactical Patrol Force finally quieted the uprising z2 The Gay
Rights movement had its Lexington and Concord.23
In June, 1967, the United State Supreme Court held Virginia's anti-
miscegenation statute unconstitutional in Loving v. Virginia.23 In
declaring bans on interracial marriage a denial of equal protection and
due process, Chief Justice Warren declared: "The freedom to marry has
long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men."235 That being the case,
marriage was defined by the Chief Justice as "one of the 'basic civil
rights of man,' fundamental to our very existence and survival.",
6
The issue of same-sex marriage is a lightning rod of controversy in
the gay rights movement. The pronouncement by Chief Justice Warren
in Loving, along with other Supreme Court decisions pronouncing
marriage as a fundamental right,27 are appealed to as precedents.m
227. Jerry Lisker, Homo Nest Raided, Queen Bees Are Stinging Mad, N.Y. DAILY NEWS,
July 6, 1969, reprinted at http:/lwww.cs.cmu.edulafs/csluser/scotts/ftplbulgarians/NY-DN
_Stonewall.txt. The headline and article possess numerous sarcastic references to the
transvestites involved in the uprising. It is difficult to imagine a similar article being written
with such condescension today-a notable statement of how far the gay rights movement has
come.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
235. Id. at 12.
236. Id. (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)).
237. See, ag., Skinner, 316 U.S. at 535 (invalidating Oklahoma's law requiring
sterilization of certain criminals); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (invalidating
Wisconsin's bar on remarriage of a former spouse who had unpaid support obligations);
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (invalidating Missouri's ban on marriage by prison
inmates).
238. The scholarship analyzing the arguments for expanding to same-sex unions the
fundamental right to marry is voluminous. See, e.g., SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: PRO AND CON
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There have been numerous attempts to create this right through
litigation .in true Charles Hamilton Houston style. In 1971, the
Minnesota Supreme Court, in Baker v. Nelson, 39 handed down the first
appellate decision in the United States on the issue of same-sex
marriage. The petitioners, Jack Baker and Mike McConnell, argued the
right to same-sex marriage was included within the right to privacy
pronounced in Griswold v. Connecticut.2'  The Minnesota Supreme
Court disagreed.2 1 Similar attempts in state courts to expand the rights
and benefits of marriage were rebuked for years.242
An occasional victory for same-sex partners has been interspersed
among the many failures, thereby invigorating the combatants. One
such victory occurred in Braschi v. Stahl Associates Co., a 1989 decision
by the New York Court of Appeals.243 A gay couple lived together in a
rent-controlled apartment for ten years.24 When the tenant on the lease
died, the landlord attempted to evict his partner (and thereby terminate
the rent-controlled lease in order to obtain a more lucrative tenancy),
arguing that only a resident surviving spouse or other family member of
the tenant of record was entitled to retain possession.245 The court of
appeals held the surviving tenant could retain possession of the rent-
controlled premises.246 The decision was based on an historic extension
of the definition of a family: "a more realistic, and certainly equally
valid, view of a family includes two adult lifetime partners whose
relationship is long term and characterized by an emotional and
financial commitment and interdependence. "2 47 This definition has since
(Andrew Sullivan ed., 1997) [hereinafter SAME-SEX MARRIAGE]; WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE,
JR., THE CASE FOR SAME SEX MARRIAGE (1996). Numerous law reviews have further
addressed the issue. See, e.g., John G. Culhane, Uprooting the Arguments Against Same-Sex
Marriage, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 1119 (1999). For a comprehensive list of law review articles
on the subject prior to 1995, see Lynn D. Wardle, A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Claims
for Same-Sex Marriage, 1996 BYU L. REV. 1, app. A, at 96 (1996).
239. 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971).
240. Id. at 186-87 (discussing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)).
241. Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 186-87.
242. See, e.g., Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119 (C.D. Cal. 1980); Jones v.
Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973); Gajovski v. Gajovski, 610 N.E.2d 431 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1991); Slayton v. State, 633 S.W.2d 934 (Tex. App. 1982); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d
1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
243. 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989).
244. Id. at 50.
245. Id. at 50-51.
246. Id. at 55.
247. Id. at 53-54. To establish the couple's relationship and "financial commitment and
interdependence," the court accepted evidence that the couple was regarded by their
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been confined only to the context of rent control.24
A few years before the historic Braschi decision, Berkeley,
California passed the first domestic partnership ordinance extending
marital-type rights to cohabiting couples. 2 49 Other municipalities have
followed Berkeley's lead, among them West Hollywood,"0 Takoma
Park, 1 Madison,22 San Francisco,' and New York.2 Most of these
ordinances allow same-sex and opposite-sex couples with capacity to
enter contracts to file as domestic partners. Such filing, for example,
extends certain health benefits, allows bereavement leave for partners of
municipal employees, and grants visitation to partners of prisoners."
At the Hawaii Department of Health on December 17, 1990, three
couples filed marriage license applications.2" Each of their applications
met all of the state's marriage license requirements except that they
were for same-sex couples.2 Pursuant to an opinion of the State
Attorney General, in April of the following year, the Hawaii
Department of Health denied these applications. 8  The case was
doggedly pursued in the courts, and on May 5, 1993, the Hawaii
Supreme Court found that the state's denial of the rights and incidents
of marriage to same-sex couples represented a denial of equal
respective families and friends (and by the building's superintendent and doorman) as a
couple. Id. at 55. Additionally, the two maintained joint savings, checking accounts, and
credit cards. Id.
24& See In re Estate of Lasek, 545 N.Y.S.2d 668 (Sup. Ct. 1989) (refusing to extend the
definition of a family in a case by a life partner against an estate for the expenses of nursing
and household services); Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991) (refusing to
extend Braschi to allow visitation rights for a same-sex partner of a child's biological mother).
249. Craig A. Bowman & Blake M. Cornish, Note, A More Perfect Union: A Legal and
Social Analysis of Domestic Partnership Ordinances, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1164 (1992) (citing
City of Berkeley, Cal., Policy Establishing Domestic Partnership Registration (1984)). For a
history and analysis of these ordinances, see Id. and Rebecca L. Melton, Note, Legal Rights of
Unmarried Heterosexual and Homosexual Couples and Evolving Definitions of "Family," 29
J. FAM. L. 497 (1991).
250. Bowman & Cornish, supra note 249, at 189 & n.120 (citing WEST HOLLYWOOD
CAL., W.H.M.C. § 4220-28 (1985)).
251. Id. at 189 & n.124 (citing TAKOMA PARK, MD. CODE §§ 6-81(a), 8b-108(b) (1986)).
252. Id. at 190 & n.129 (citing MADISON, WIS. GENERAL ORDINANCES § 3.36(15)
(1988)).
253. Id. at 189 & n.122 (citing SAN FRANCISCO, CAL. ORDINANCE 176-89 (1989)).
254. Id. at 190 & n.130 (citing New York, N.Y. Exec. Order No. 123 (Koch 1989)).
255. See generally id.
256. ESKRIDGE, supra note 238, at 4.
257. Id.
258. Id.
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protection." 9
Although the petitioners' right to privacy argument failed, ° the
court found sex was a "suspect" classification under the equal protection
clause of the Hawaii Constitution.261 In applying a strict scrutiny test to
the state's marriage laws, the court held that the state failed to display a
compelling interest for the state's sex-based classification." The court
listed "a multiplicity of rights and benefits" that accompany a marriage
license, including "the benefit of the exemption of real property from
attachment or execution... ." The case was remanded to a trial court,
affording the state an opportunity to justify the denial by a compelling
state interest.26
The fear across America was of same-sex couples flocking to Hawaii,
obtaining marriage licenses, and populating the country. States would
be forced to recognize these unions under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause of the U.S. Constitution, m so the argument went.2" Resistance
came from several fronts. On May 7, 1996, House Bill 3396 was
introduced in Congress, reading in part: "[n]o State... shall be required
to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any
other State... respecting a relationship between persons of the same
sex that is treated as a marriage ... 267 Virulent debate followed on
what familiarly became known as the Defense of Marriage Act.2
259. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
260. Id. at 55-57. The court refused to proclaim a fundamental right to same sex
marriage: "[W]e do not believe that a right to same-sex marriage is so rooted in the traditions
and collective conscience of our people that failure to recognize it would violate the
fundamental principles of liberty and justice that lie at the base of all our civil and political
institutions." Id. at 57.
261. Id. at 64.
262. Id. at 57-67.
263. Id. at 59.
264. Id. at 68.
265. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, cl. 1.
266. But see Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the
Unconstitutional Public Policy Exception, 106 YALE L. J. 1965 (1997) (refuting this
argument).
267. Defense of Marriage Act, H.R. 3396, 104th Congress (1996).
268. SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, supra note 238, at 205-38. Alternatively, Congressman
John Lewis of Georgia christened it "the defense of mean-spirited bigots act." Id. Lewis
noted, in a passionate attack on the act: "I have fought too hard and too long against
discrimination based on race and color not to stand up against discrimination based on sexual
orientation." Id. Congressman Lewis, a hero of the civil rights movement, fought
discrimination as a college student in Nashville, Tennessee, as a freedom rider in milieus at
bus depots across the south, and led the march across the Pettus Bridge in Selma, Alabama.
See DAVID HALBERSTAM, THE CHILDREN (1998).
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Ultimately, the law was passed by an overwhelming majority and signed
into law by President Clinton in the middle of the night on Saturday,
September 21, 1996.2 69 The reaction in Hawaii was no different.'0 In the
November 1998 election, an overwhelming majority of voters, in a
referendum previously passed by the state legislature, accepted the
following amendment to the Hawaii Constitution: "[t]he legislature shall
have the power to reserve marriage to opposite-sex couples. " 271
Notwithstanding this determined resistance, on December 20, 1999,
the Vermont Supreme Court in Baker v. State held that the state's
exclusion of same-sex couples from the benefits and incidents of
marriage violated the common benefits clause of the Vermont
Constitution.m In similar fashion to the approach taken by the Hawaii
Supreme Court, Chief Justice Amestoy cited the throng of benefits
attached to a marriage license.2' Such benefits establish the test to be
applied in the court's analysis: "The legal benefits and protections
flowing from a marriage license are of such significance that any
statutory exclusion must necessarily be grounded on public concerns of
sufficient weight, cogency, and authority that the justice of the
deprivation cannot seriously be questioned."274
The main concern the state put forth was the link between marriage
and procreation." The decision easily dismissed this argument, noting
"that many opposite-sex couples marry for reasons [wholly] unrelated to
procreation" and that numerous same-sex couples today are raising
children. 6 So, limiting the right to marry to the former bore no relation
to the state's objective.'m The court concluded that without a justifiable
269. Culhane, supra note 238, at 1122.
270. See supra notes 256-69 and accompanying text.
271. HAW. CONST. art. 1, § 23.
272. 744 A.2d 864, 886 (Vt. 1999). The common benefits clause of the Vermont
Constitution reads, in part: "That government is, or ought to be, instituted for the common
benefit, protection, and security of the people, nation or community, and not for the
particular emolument or advantage of any single person, family, or set of persons, who are a
part only of that community .... " VT. CONST. art. VII, ch. I.
273. Baker, 744 A.2d at 883. Incidentally, among those rights listed were "homestead
rights and protections," and "the presumption of joint ownership of property and the
concomitant right of survivorship." Id. at 884.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 881.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 880-81. To prove this point, the decision lists a number of reports on lesbian
and homosexual couples raising children and progressively notes that "increasing numbers of
same-sex couples are employing increasingly efficient assisted-reproductive techniques to
conceive and raise children." Id. at 882.
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purpose behind the state's exclusion, there is "a constitutional obligation
to extend to plaintiffs the common benefit, protection, and security that
Vermont law provides opposite-sex married couples. "278
Admitting that "courts may not have the best or the final answers, 279
the majority left it to "the Legislature to craft an appropriate means of
addressing the constitutional mandate. '" On March 16, 2000, the
Vermont House of Representatives voted seventy-six to sixty-nine in
favor of a bill that would create for same-sex couples the option of
entering into a "civil union" recognized by the state. 8' By applying for a
license from a town clerk, the couple would receive a certificate of civil
union carrying with it all of the rights and benefits attached to a
marriage certificate, including the obligation of bringing an action for
dissolution in family court upon separating.' On April 26, 2000,
Governor Howard Dean signed Vermont's historic civil union bill into
law, allowing same-sex couples to form civil unions as of July 1, 2000.21
This remarkably progressive proposal does, however, still fall short of
allowing the union to be called a marriage.
B. Forgotten Casualties: Cohabiting Couples
In light of the pending confrontation between the immovable object,
in the form of the Defense of Marriage Act, and the irresistible force, in
the form of Vermont's civil unions, the war over same-sex marriage
likely will continue to be a hard-fought struggle. Certain corporations
and businesses have also extended domestic partnership-type rights
similar to those provided by municipalities discussed herein.
However, these inroads made by same-sex couples have created new
claims of discrimination, specifically by heterosexual cohabiting
couples."
In 1970, there were 523,000 unmarried couples-defined as "two
278. Id. at 886.
279. Id. at 888 (quoting Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110
HARV. L. REv. 4, 101 (1996)).
280. Id. at 886.
281. Carey Goldberg, Vermont's House Backs Wide Rights for Gay Couples, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 17,2000, at Al.
282. Id.
283. Vermont Civil Union Bill Becomes Law, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27,2000.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Foray v. Bell Atlantic, 56 F. Supp. 2d 379, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
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unrelated adults of the opposite sex-sharing the same household."
By 1980, that number had increased three-fold to 1,589,000.M
Additionally, 431,000 of those unmarried cohabiting couples had at least
one child under fifteen years of age.29 In 1998, 4,236,000 unmarried
cohabiting couples resided in the United States-an increase of 800
percent in a mere twenty-eight years.2' Significantly, 1,520,000 of these
couples had children under the age of fifteen.291 The tremendous
increase in the numbers of couples cohabiting without the formalities of
a marriage license shows that they are a sizable percentage of the
population whose numbers likely will increase.
One such cohabiting couple is Paul Foray and Jeanine Muntzer.2
Mr. Foray is a long-time employee of Bell Atlantic, formerly Nynex.'
In January 1996, Bell Atlantic enacted a policy extending health benefits
to same-sex couples.' After Mr. Foray learned of this policy, he
applied for health benefits for his partner (who had recently quit her
full-time job to study to become a nurse, thereby losing her health
benefits) and was denied295 He was told by Bell Atlantic that he had the
option of getting married.296 Having three divorces between them, the
marriage option was simply one that the couple did not want to
pursue.' Notwithstanding the absence of a marriage certificate, Ms.
Muntzer stated their relationship was no different from that of a
married couple: "[w]e have a home and a dog, and we have a committed
relationship."2
On May 18, 1998, Paul Foray filed suit in federal court alleging that
the company's policy violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.2'
Mr. Foray claimed that if his gender were female, his domestic partner
287. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES
1988, tbl. 54 (108th ed. 1988).
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACr OF THE UNITED STATES
1999, tbl. 68 (119th ed. 1999) [hereinafter STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 1999].
291. Id.
292. The following account is from Dennis Duggan, Waging New Battle in Sex
Revolution, N.Y. NEWSDAY, May 19,1998, available at 1998 WL 2670603.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Foray v. Bell Atlantiq 56 F. Supp. 2d 327,329 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
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would be considered an eligible dependent and would be entitled to
receive health benefits.c ° On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
cause of action, the court rejected the plaintiff's argument.3' As the
court noted, in order to establish sex discrimination, the plaintiff had to
"show that he was treated differently from 'similarly situated' persons of
the opposite sex."' ' The court held that the plaintiff did not meet this
burden, stating: "[A] woman with a female domestic partner is
differently situated from plaintiff in material respects because under
current law, she, unlike plaintiff, is unable to marry her partner. " 30'
Whether this argument necessarily defeats all claims to extend
benefits to unmarried, cohabiting, heterosexual couples remains to be
seen.' Taken to its logical conclusion, the option-to-marry argument
could be used to reject any gender-based discrimination claim, as a
woman through modern surgical procedures has the option of changing
genders. Recognition of the well-deserved rights for same-sex couples
will likely increase the claims of cohabiting heterosexual couples. Thus,
some sort of alternative that equalizes rights for all denied groups would
be a preferable option.
C. Rights Denied, Realities Ignored: Single Parents and Subsequent
Marriages
Today, in addition to the numerous same-sex couples and unmarried
cohabiting heterosexual couples constituting families, less than sixty
percent of the United States population is married and ten percent is
divorced. 5 Comparatively, in 1950, the married population numbered
sixty-seven percent and the divorced population two percent.", Further,
single parents comprise a sizable percentage of the families in the
nation.-" Today, over twenty-three percent of the families in the United
States are single parent households.3 That number was a mere twelve
300. Id.
301. Id. at 330.
302. Id. at 329.
303. Id. at 330.
304. This is the second ruling of its kind at the district court level. See also Cleaves v.
City of Chicago, 21 F. Supp. 2d 858, 861 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (rejecting a claim that an employee
benefits plan covering spouses and homosexual couples only, to the exclusion of unmarried
heterosexual partners, was a Title VII sex discrimination violation).
305. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 1999, supra note 290, tbl. 70.
306. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES
1982-1983, tbl. 60 (103d ed. 1983) [hereinafter STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 1982-1983].
307. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 1999, supra note 290, tbl. 70.
308. Id.
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percent in 1950."o  Divorced persons and single parents, similar to
cohabiting homosexual and heterosexual couples, are denied the
benefits of the tenancy by the entirety.
310
A necessary corollary of the increasing divorce rate is the increase in
subsequent marriages and the existence of children from prior
marriages. Ironically, the very existence of the tenancy by the entirety
creates additional problems in the situation of subsequent marriages.
When a divorced person with children remarries and buys a home with
his or her new spouse, the new husband and wife would own as tenants
by the entirety in those states where it exists.3 1 Upon the death of the
remarried spouse, any property owned as a tenancy by the entirety
would be excluded from the decedent's estate.3 2 Thus, children from
the prior marriage would be excluded from inheriting any property held
in that manner.
V. A TRANSFORMATION IN CONCURRENT OWNERSHIP FOR MODERN
RELATIONSHIPS
Although Littleton and his contemporaries would be very familiar
with the methods of concurrent ownership which are recognized today,
the modern day conception of relationships and the family likely would
be unrecognizable. Currently, couples and families who are comparable
in most important respects are treated unequally. A crusade is being
fought; one side fights to preserve the concept of marriage and family,
the other side fights to expand it. Still others are ignored as their rights
lay as casualties on the battlefield. While the war wages on, updating
the antiquated methods of concurrent ownership is a solution that would
rectify some of the disparities that currently exist. In this cause there
are several options.
A. Abolishing the Tenancy by the Entirety
This popular solution is the simplest method for creating a level
playing field among the numerous interests that exist. As discussed
herein, the tenancy by the entirety has been abrogated in thirteen states
309. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 1982-1983, supra note 306, tbl. 60.
310. See supra notes 62-77 and accompanying text.
311. See supra notes 62-77 and accompanying text.
312. PAUL G. HASKELL, PREFACE TO WILLS, TRUSTS AND ADMINISTRATION 130 (2d
ed. 1994).
313. Id.
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and in England.3"4 Advocates for abolition are numerous. An American
Bar Association report from 1944 called for complete abolition of the
ancient tenancy wherever it still existed.3"3  Treatises and law review
articles echo this demand 316 or expose some of the estate's idiosyncratic
anomalies. 17 Several law reviews have criticized the ways in which the
tenancy by the entirety can be used to avoid child support payments ,
bar federal tax liens,319 and circumvent criminal and civil forfeiture
laws.3" Also, the treatment of entireties estates by the bankruptcy code
is in a state of confusion.32
Outright abolition will forever remove the reminders of the sexism
inherent in the ancient concept. The tenancy by the entirety was
necessitated by women's status as legally indistinct from their
husbands.32 Additionally, women, being property themselves, did not
have the capacity to own property-obviously a chair cannot own a
table. In practice, the entireties estates protected women as they
afforded them the ability to have an ownership interest in land-
specifically the right of survivorship.32' However, until the nineteenth
century and the passage of married women's property legislation, the
one-half interest which women held in the estate was a dubious right
314. See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
315. 2 ATKINSON ET AL., supra note 23, § 6.6, at 32.
316. See, e.g., id.; Jane Harper Porter, Comment, Real-Property Tenancy by the Entirety
in North Carolina: An Idea Whose Time Has Gone?, 58 N.C. L. REV. 997 (1980).
317. MOYNIHAN, supra note 52, at 234-35.
In situations where the marriage relationship is unstable, the tenancy can operate to
the disadvantage of one or both of the spouses. The inability of either spouse to
compel partition or to effectuate a severance, or in some states to convey a separate
interest to a third person, can create a deadlock with respect to the property.
Id. at 234.
318. Robert D. Null, Note, Tenancy by the Entirety as an Asset Shield: An Unjustified
Safe Haven for Delinquent Child Support Obligors, 29 VAL. U. L. REV. 1057 (1995).
319. Steve R. Johnson, Fog, Fairness, and the Federal Fisc: Tenancy-by-the-Entireties
Interests and the Federal Tax Lien, 60 Mo. L. REV. 839 (1995).
320. Eric G. Zajac, Tenancies by the Entirety and Federal Civil Forfeiture Under the
Crime Abuse Prevention and Control Act: A Clash of Titans, 54 U. PrIr. L. REV. 553 (1993);
Barbara W. Sharp, Note, Losing Sticks from the Bundle: Incompatibility of Tenancy by the
Entireties and Drug Forfeiture Laws, 8 BYU J. PUB. L. 197 (1993).
321. Massey, supra note 91, at 49. "The tenancy by the entirety doctrine is one of the
most disputed and confusing issues facing bankruptcy courts." Id. See also Steven B.
Chaneles, Tenancy by the Entireties: Has the Bankruptcy Court Found a Chink in the Armor?,
71 FLA. B.J. 22 (1997); Paul C. Wilson, Note, "Fresh Start" or "Head Start": Missouri Courts
Rethink the Role of Tenancies by the Entirety in Bankruptcy, 56 MO. L. REV. 817 (1991).
32Z See supra notes 134-52 and accompanying text.
323. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. '
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since their husbands had the exclusive rights of control and of collecting
the rents and profits from the land.324 Also, the creditors of the husband
could attach the land.' Arguably, since the gender equalization that
resulted from the reform legislation, the sexism inherent in the ancient
tenancy of medieval times is as much a relic as the estate's origins.
32 6
However, even in the present day, the language used in the habendum
clause of a deed to create a tenancy by the entirety maintains the stigma
of a husband's possession of his wife: "to John Jones and Jane Jones, his
wife. 327
Although the spirit of this proposal to abolish the tenancy by the
entirety is equality across the board, the benefits of the estate should not
be brushed aside. Intuitively, preservation of the family home is at the
core of the modern concept of tenancy. A change in the law that results
in disadvantaging everyone and which leads in practice to displacing
children from their homes is difficult to justify at any level. Admittedly,
children of single parents, same-sex couples, and unmarried cohabiting
couples are denied this protection.32 A better solution would be one
that expands the benefits to formerly denied groups rather than denies
the benefits to everyone. Abolishing the tenancy by the entirety would
eradicate any philanthropic hopes of creating a unique estate whose
core purpose is to encompass a broader view of the family.
B. Altering the Tenancy by the Entirety
The fifth unity whose existence is necessary to create a tenancy by
the entirety, the "unity of person, ' ' is the root cause of the inequity in
the methods of concurrent ownership. Logically, if the cause of the
problem is removed, the problem itself will be eradicated. However,
that conclusion proves to be fallacious. Expanding the tenancy by the
324. See supra notes 175-88 and accompanying text.
325. See supra notes 78-86 and accompanying text.
326. The accuracy of this assertion is doubtful considering the slow and gradual
equalization of the rights between spouses well into the twentieth century. See supra Part
III.B.
327. See CASES AND MATERIALS ON MODERN PROPERTY LAW, supra note 1, at 280.
There are numerous other ways to create a tenancy by the entirety, including "to John Jones
and Jane Jones, as husband and wife." Id. However, real estate practitioners are familiar
with this old sexist clause that appears on deeds with great frequency. Although one could
argue this language is simply a benign term of art, it is still a reminder of a thankfully bygone
era of gender inequality.
328. See supra notes 62-77 and accompanying text.
329. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
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entirety to include non-married persons is not a unique proposition.3
Clearly, under current law, there is no way to create a similarly
beneficial tenancy.33 However, the obvious ramifications of this
solution make it less acceptable than the present state of affairs.
Removal of the marriage requirement opens the door for the
tenancy by the entirety to be used as an effective weapon for a
multitude of persons to defraud creditors. It is not difficult to imagine
numerous persons holding property as tenants by the entirety with no
relationship and nothing in common besides an unscrupulous and
avaricious desire to create effective creditor-proof estates. Thus,
although this alteration to the tenancy by the entirety would thoroughly
equalize the rights of all persons, the concomitant and comprehensive
denial of creditor's rights simply makes it an unacceptable solution.
Additionally, the spirit behind the protections afforded the tenancy by
the entirety-the mantra of preserving the family home-is lost in this
proposal. In order to stay faithful to this cause, the owners of tenancies
by the entirety must bear some resemblance to a family unit.
C. The "Familial" Residence Exemption
Alternative legislation could be enacted to rectify the inequity
created by the tenancy by the entirety without becoming entangled in
the complexities of the tenancy. The core concern of protecting the
family unit is not entirely served through protecting marital property. A
married couple is often an incidence of a family, but certainly not a
necessity. Thus, protecting "familial" property would be the broadest
way to satisfy the core concerns at stake. Toward that goal, a statute
could be enacted which allows a "familial residence" exemption. Such a
statute would require language in the habendum clause of a deed such
as the following: "to John Jones and John Smith, to own as their familial
residence." Certain additional safeguards are necessary before such a
right could be created. This special method of owning property should
only be available for a primary residence and would not be a shield
against the underlying financing on the premises. In order to prevent
persons from claiming that their primary residence is a one hundred unit
building with lucrative commercial and residential rents (where the
330. See, e.g., Orth, supra note 7, at 47. "Today, no discussion of the tenancy by the
entirety would be complete without addressing one final question: Why is the tenancy by the
entirety still limited to married persons?" Id.
331. Id. at 48. "No combination of joint tenancy or tenancy in common plus contracts
not to partition and to make a will can give the unmarried couple all the benefits
automatically conferred on spouses holding property as tenants by the entirety." Id.
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cotenants just happen to reside in the penthouse), it would be necessary
to limit the protections of the familial residence to non-multiple
dwellings (for example, three families or less).
This concept of creating a safe-haven for a family residence has its
roots in the nineteenth century homestead exemptions.332 These acts
allowed a homeowner to designate real property as a homestead and
thereby exempt the land from execution by creditors.333 In fact,
proposals to eliminate the tenancy by the entirety have recommended
replacing these estates with improved homestead laws.'3  Many states
have enacted homestead laws; 35 however, to provide protections
equally, the laws must be expanded to include non-marital couples, be
they same-sex or cohabiting opposite-sex couples, and single parents.
Although such legislation would increase the number and size of
family homes afforded protection from attachment by creditors,
problems of succession, specifically in the context of subsequent
marriages where children from prior marriages exist, would not be
remedied by this proposal. Also, the familial residence exemption still
denies unmarried persons the full package of rights that accompany the
tenancy by the entirety.
D. The Creation of a More Equitable Tenancy
We have identified several so-called new types of couples whose
numbers are rapidly increasing-specifically cohabiting homosexuals
and heterosexuals. Additionally, we have acknowledged the existence
of single parents and subsequent marriages with children of prior
marriages as being prevalent throughout history. We have identified
various flaws with the methods of concurrent ownership as they
currently exist in addressing the unique interests of the above groups.
Specifically, the unavailability of the tenancy by the entirety to
cohabiting homosexuals and heterosexuals and single parents denies
these groups the creditor protection afforded to married couples and
denies a simple technique for devising land at death to a partner.
Further, the existence of the tenancy by the entirety could work to deny
children of a prior marriage from inheriting property from their
remarried parent.
332. See George L. Haskins, Homestead Exemptions, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1289 (1950).
333. Id.
334. 2 ATKINSON ET AL, supra note 23, § 6.6, at 32.
335. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 222.01 (West 1998); TaX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.001
(Vernon 1996).
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Ultimately, a new form of concurrent ownership might be the only
alternative to achieve equality among the various interests in light of the
deficiencies in the above suggestions. Concurrent owners of real
property have been restricted for six hundred years to a choice among
the joint tenancy, the tenancy in common, and (for married couples) the
tenancy by the entirety. The existing tenancies from the age of antiquity
seem insufficient to handle the complexities of modem society.
Legislation to create a fourth tenancy may be the best solution to the
problems raised thus far and could comprehensively include all of those
persons whose rights have formerly been denied.
This new tenancy would resemble a modified tenancy in common,
with dual life estates, an optional right of survivorship, and the incidents
of the aforementioned familial residence exemption. Tenants would
own divisible, one-half interests in an estate, similar to tenants in
common. These tenants would also possess a life estate as to the
cotenant's one-half interest. Such a life estate would not attach to the
survivor's interest since that would create an interest in the heirs of the
survivor. This would have the effect of creating rights where no rights
existed before; the surviving tenant would need to obtain the permission
of his or her own heirs in order to alienate or encumber his or her own
interest.
The purpose of this life estate as against the heirs of the deceased
cotenant is two-fold. First, the intent of the original parties to the new
tenancy would be preserved, since the heirs of the first cotenant to die
would be unable to bring a partition action. They would possess an
interest that would not be activated until the survivor dies. Thus, if the
tenants intended to preserve a family residence for their lives together
that continues after the death of one, this intent would be protected.
Additionally, the dual life estates protect the interests of the heirs of
each cotenant. Upon the survivor's death, the heirs of each cotenant
would inherit their ancestor's fifty percent interest, and the formerly
dormant interests of the heirs of the first deceased cotenant would be
awoken. Thus, the interests of the tenants and their heirs are preserved
simultaneously. An option of creating a right of survivorship, in the
alternative to the dual life estates, would allow the new tenancy to be
the virtual equivalent of the tenancy by the entirety.
3 1
The protection from creditor's claims afforded by the previously
discussed "familial residence" exemption could also be available to the
336. This right of survivorship would be created in the new tenancy just as it is created
today, by adding "with a right of survivorship" in the habendum clause of the deed.
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new tenancy. By labeling the estate the "familial residence," creditors
would be unable to attach the estate unless they possessed a mortgage
secured by the premises. This would be a change from the protection
afforded a tenancy by the entirety since, in most jurisdictions
recognizing the tenancy, creditors of both spouses can attach the
premises. Therefore, the familial residence exemption would provide
greater rights than the entireties estate. To avoid defrauding creditors,
the familial residence should only be available for a primary residence
that is a non-multiple dwelling, as discussed herein. And, as not to
unduly burden creditors, a provision in a statute might allow only one
property at a time to be held by the new tenancy. Under this reform,
the familial residence option would not be confined to the narrow
concept of a family as a husband and wife.
Partition would be a right shared equally by tenants utilizing this
new form of concurrent ownership. They commenced the tenancy on
their own accord and should be able to terminate it freely and
unilaterally. Of course, to do so, both sides must be aware of the
partition; a unilateral severance would be ineffectual.3 37 The familial
residence exemption would prevent creditors (besides those holding a
mortgage on the premises) from forcing a partition against the non-
debtor tenant. Allowing partition is necessary for an additional reason.
Since the new tenancy is an alternative method of creating a family
residence, there must be some way for this family relationship to be
terminated absent the divorce option.
Applying the new tenancy to a few hypothetical relationships will
help to fully understand the way it would work in practice. A
comparison of the current options of concurrent ownership available to
these relationships displays the full benefits of, and necessity for, a new
tenancy. For purposes of this analysis, New York law will be applied
since it recognizes the joint tenancy, tenancy in common, and tenancy by
the entirety.33 Additionally, tenants by the entirety in New York are
afforded only partial protection from creditors.39 Thus, the familial
residence exemption would be an expansion of these protections.'
337. This would avoid the possibility of severing the tenancy through the secret
severance deed as discussed in Fetters, supra note 44, at 175.
338. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 6-2.2 (McKinney 2000).
339. 13 WARREN WEED'S NEW YORK REAL PROPERTY § 4.03[1], at 37 (1999).
340. In New York the interest of a debtor-tenant by the entirety is subject to a judgment
lien and may be sold upon the levy of execution. Id. Upon sale, the purchaser holds the
debtor-tenant's one-half interest as a tenant in common with the non-debtor tenant by the
entirety. Id. However, the purchaser cannot bring a partition sale as he is subject to the
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Today, if a cohabiting couple (either a same-sex couple or unmarried
opposite-sex couple) buys a family home, they have the option of
holding the premises as tenants in common or joint tenants.3" If the
couple holds as tenants in common, each would possess a separate one-
half interest in the estate. 2 If one cotenant were to die without a will,
the survivor and the heirs of the deceased cotenant each would own a
one-half interest. 3 This forces the surviving cotenant to attempt to buy
out the heirs' interest or to be forcibly removed by a partition action.'
Likewise, creditors could perfect a judgment against each cotenant's
individual share and bring a partition action.' 5 The execution of a will
would afford the cotenants some protection.6 However, intestate heirs
could contest a will.' 7 Even if the will contest fails, substantial legal fees
could be incurred. Ultimately, the creation of a tenancy in common is
an unsatisfactory option for a cohabiting couple.
Alternatively, the cohabiting partners could hold title to the estate as
joint tenants with a right of survivorship.m Here, the partners' interests
are better protected. Upon the death of either joint tenant, his interest
goes to the survivor?' Thus, the heirs of the prior deceased joint tenant
would gain no interest and would be unable to contest a will, since the
transfer operates under the deed and outside of the laws of intestacy.30
These heirs of the first joint tenant to die are placed in an unfair position
since the surviving joint tenant's heirs would stand to receive the entire
estate.35 If the joint tenants have the same heirs, either natural children
of a cohabiting opposite-sex couple or adoptive children of a same-sex
couple, then this does not present a problem. When the joint tenants
have no children, the inequity results to the heirs of the first to die. An
additional problem with holding as joint tenants is that the creditors of
tenant's right of survivorship. Id. If the debtor-tenant (whose interest was obtained by the
purchaser at the judicial sale) dies first, the purchaser loses his entire interest. Id. If,
however, the non-debtor tenant dies first, pursuant to the right of survivorship, the purchaser
at the judicial sale succeeds to the entire estate. Id.
341. CASES AND MATERIALS ON MODERN PROPERTY LAW, supra note 1, at 278-79.
342. Id. at 278.
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
346. HASKELL, supra note 312, at 9.
347. Id. at 223-24.
348. CASES AND MATERIALS ON MODERN PROPERTY LAW, supra note 1, at 278-79.
349. Id.
350. HASKELL, supra note 312, at 148-49.
351. Id. at 128-29.
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each individual tenant could perfect a judgment against and foreclose
upon a joint tenants' interest; the result is a partition action and ouster
from the family home. Thus, the joint tenancy with a right of
survivorship gives the parties greater protection, but the heirs of the first
to die suffer. Also, the joint tenants do not enjoy the same protections
as tenants by the entirety.
If a same-sex couple with no children purchases a non-multiple
dwelling, the new tenancy would more closely meet their wishes and
afford them greater protection than the options which currently exist.
Upon the death of the first cotenant, the survivor would possess a life
estate as against the heirs of the deceased cotenant. After the death of
the survivor, the heirs of both cotenants would acquire their ancestor's
interest.' During their lives, based on the familial residence exemption,
individual creditors of each cotenant would be unable to perfect a
judgment against the premises." The original intent of the partners is
preserved, and their separate heirs will still be entitled to an inheritance.
If an unmarried opposite-sex couple with mutual children owned a
non-multiple dwelling under the new tenancy (with a right of
survivorship), they would also benefit from the familial residence
exemption. One might conclude that a joint tenancy with the familial
residence exemption would have the same effect. However, the right to
partition, which would be denied to creditors of tenants holding under
the new form of concurrent ownership, provides an additional
protection that joint tenants do not enjoy. By holding the property
under the new tenancy, but with a right of survivorship, the survivor
takes the entire estate, and the mutual offspring of the couple would
have his or her inheritance preserved in whole.
Altering the hypotheticals, an unmarried opposite-sex couple with
no children, or with children from prior relationships, should form the
new tenancy without the right of survivorship. This would allow them to
preserve their familial residence and prevent their partner's children
from forcing a partition. Concomitantly, each partner's children from
his or her former relationships would have their inheritance preserved
and actualized upon the death of the survivor. Logically, a same-sex
couple with mutual offspring (possibly through adoption or a
combination of adoption and in-vitro fertilization) should form the new
tenancy with a right of survivorship.
352. Since the cotenants hold separate interests, they could allow their intestate heirs to
inherit or choose to devise the estate pursuant to a will.
353. See supra Part V.D.
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In the situation of a subsequent marriage with children from a prior
relationship, the new tenancy is particularly effective."' The surviving
spouse of the second marriage could not be forced out through a
partition, and the familial residence protection would be afforded the
tenants. Additionally, the children from the former marriage would
have their inheritance preserved.
Paradoxically, with subsequent marriages in times past, society did
not want to postpone the enjoyment of the estate to posterity since the
heirs would take over the land and maintain its productivity.5 The
adult children would take over the family farm and provide an income
while allowing their widowed mother to continue in her enjoyment of
the land. 6 Even if the heirs were less benevolent, a widow's right of
dower (to a life estate on her husband's land) and the corresponding
widower's right of courtesy would prevent the heirs from removing the
surviving spouse. 7 Today, with the termination of these rights and the
increasing obsolescence of the family farm, the necessity of immediate
inheritance has waned. Additionally, modern retirement benefits,
unknown before the twentieth century, usually allow a surviving spouse
to finance the estate without the help of the family.358
The addition of the familial residence exemption in the new tenancy
is vital for the protection of single parents.359 It is an unfathomable set of
circumstances whereby, under the current law, a married couple without
children is afforded protection from creditors, yet a single person with
children does not have that same protection. Besides a single parent
having the added cost of raising a family, he or she must do so on one
salary. So, by allowing a single parent owner of land to hold it as his or
her familial residence, a glaring inequity is resolved.
An additional result of creating a new and more equitable method of
concurrent ownership is the probable extinction of the tenancy by the
entirety. Those entireties estates currently in existence will not be
affected. However, the desirability of the new tenancy will discourage
the creation of new tenancies by the entirety; in sixty or seventy years
354. This tenancy will be effective, provided of course, that the new tenancy would be
available to married persons. To deny them this right would be illogical and unjust, since the
familial residence exemption creates greater rights than currently available under some states'
tenancies by the entirety.
355. HASKELL, supra note 312, at 148-49.
356. Id.
357. Id.
358. Id.
359. The statute must entitle tenancies in severalty in the familial residence exemption.
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the last such tenancy will quietly disappear, and along with it, any
surviving sexist stigma.
VI. CONCLUSION
Creating a new and more equitable tenancy will not remedy the
injustices prevalent in a system that affords numerous marital benefits to
those few that fall under the traditional definition of a married couple.
Nor will it counteract any intolerance for these individuals who feel that
they are as much a family as any husband and wife. Other aspects of the
law will continue to deny rights to all of the groups discussed throughout
the course of this Article. However, when laws from antiquity operate
unjustly, centuries after their original purposes have long since
disappeared, an illogical injustice demands a cure. Simply, the law of
concurrent ownership, still mired in medieval times, deserves a
renaissance.
* * *
